Maddy's book is a most welcome contribution to literature on Wittgenstein in that it tries to engage with Wittgenstein from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of logic, rather than treating him as a figure of some historical interest, but mostly surpassed by subsequent analytic philosophy. Regrettably, the latter seems to be the more common perception in mainstream analytic philosophy. (Regrettably, because this assumption seems wrong.) Indeed, it seems a fairly common conception in contemporary analytic philosophy that Wittgenstein has no later philosophy of logic -or at most only a negative one that denies the philosophical value of the logic of Frege, Russell and the Tractatus. Never mind that in the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein lists the philosophy of logic as one of the six key topics addressed in the book. Against this perception of Wittgen-stein, Maddy's book seems a refreshing exception, and I confess to pre-ordering the book before it was out, and before I was invited to review it.
More specifically, The Logical Must is a discussion of Wittgenstein's early and late philosophy of logic from the point of view of a form of naturalism which Maddy calls "second philosophy". (To set the scene, she starts with a brief discussion of Kant and how to naturalize his transcendental philosophy.) Second philosophy itself is an empiricist account of the nature of logical truth, according to which logic is grounded in and justified by the structure of the contingent world, with evolution having tuned our "cognitive machinery" to detect relevant structures there. But while the Tractatus too, according to Maddy, seeks to ground logic on the structure of reality, Wittgenstein insists there on "the priority of sense", a view according to which the sense of a proposition must be understandable independently of knowledge of facts. According to Maddy, this commitment to the priority of sense is ultimately optional, however, so that a "naturalizing move" (slightly different from the naturalization of Kant) can be applied to the Tractatus, which brings it into conformity with second philosophy. Moreover, given that the later Wittgenstein rejects the priority of sense himself, he seems even friendlier to second philosophical naturalization. The only obstacle now is, Maddy maintains, Wittgenstein's "prohibition of science". Luckily, this is only a personal idiosyncrasy, however, and "nothing essential to the late Wittgenstein is lost when the prohibition against science is removed" (p. 125). According to Maddy, no principled justification can be found in Wittgenstein for the view that philosophy shouldn't be complemented and supported by empirical science, and so Wittgenstein's philosophy can be read in the light of her second philosophy.
More problems could be raised regarding Maddy's reading of Wittgenstein and, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, regarding her second philosophical outlook than is possible in this review. I raise two issues, one relating to the Tractatus and one to the later philosophy, that indicate some sources of my disappointment with the book. For ultimately I was disappointed in just that respect in which I had originally welcomed it: despite Maddy's claim that the "primary aim" of the book is "to understand Wittgenstein better" (p.3.), the book seems to almost completely fail to engage with Wittgenstein's philosophy, and it seems that this is exactly because of Maddy's desire to read him through second philosophical lenses. In speaking here of her failure to engage with Wittgenstein I'm only partly referring to her heavy reliance on selected secondary literature, most notably the controversial realist reading of the Tractatus by David Pears. This is certainly significant in that on this reading the key claim of the Tractatus is a metaphysical one concerning the determination of the structure of language/thought/logic by the structure of reality, and only on such a reading it even begins to look like Maddy's naturalizing move might be applicable here. By contrast, on an interpretation that seems much better supported by the text, the key claim of the Tractatus is that logic cannot be justified with reference to facts because logic involves no factual claims. Rather, logic is something shown, its principles being relied on in making any statements and giving justifications (cf. Sheffer's logocentric predicament). Accordingly, correctness in logic means something quite different from correctness in factual discourses. It is not a matter of whether the structure of language/thought/logic matches reality, which is how Maddy Maddy does quote and refer to Wittgenstein himself more when discussing the later philosophy. But here too she has a tendency to take the meaning of Wittgenstein's words to be obvious and not in need of much reflection. Curiously, this seems to lead to her missing the problem at the very heart of Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic, which arises when he stops thinking about language/though/logic as if it were an abstract entity, and acknowledges that what logic is, is not independent of contingencies relating to language users and their environment. This view of logic as embedded in contingencies is something that Wittgenstein and the second philosopher do share, and Maddy is right about that. But whereas this acknowledgement seems to signal the end of philosophy of logic for Maddy in that all we need to do now is to admit this state of affairs and give up thinking of logic as "something special", i.e. that its claims involve necessity and generality that differs from the empirical sciences (chapter 6), for Wittgenstein this constitutes one of the core questions of the philosophy of logic. For, if the task of logic is to describe and clarify contingent (but not only that, also: inexact and complex) uses of language, does this not make the statements of logic contingent too (as well as inexact and imperspicuously complex)? But then how can logic avoid a collapse into psychology or anthropology (or for Maddy, cognitive science)? And how is it now possible to explain the curious feature of logical statements that, unlike empirical statements, they seem to exclude the very possibility, not only actuality, of exceptions. For instance, in a system where 'p ˄ ~p' is a contradiction, it is never the case that both sentences are true. There simply is no room for the consideration that perhaps sometimes this would not hold, whereas any empirical generalization admits the possibility of exceptions, even if they are actually excluded. (That there may be different logical systems is irrelevant to this question, as is the possibility that the system might not be applicable everywhere, for instance in quantum mechanics. The question is how to explain exceptionless necessity right here, as a feature of the system mentioned as an example.) This is what Wittgenstein means by the hardness of logical must, and as he says in a remark that Maddy quotes as a motto in the beginning of her introduction "What you say seems to amount to this, that logic belongs to the natural history of man. And that is not compatible with the hardness of the logical 'must'" (p. 
